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We study the possible implications of incentive schemes as a tool to promote efﬁciency in the
management of universities. In this paper, we show that by designing internal ﬁnancial rules which
create yardstick competition for research funds, a multi-department university may induce better
teaching quality and research, as compared to the performance of independent departments.
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In European countries, higher education institutions are mostly funded with public
money. While universities are essentially organized along nonmarket-based structure, the
recent evolution of recruitment on the one hand and of public budgets on the other hand
put pressures on the management of those universities. Nowadays, much emphasis is
placed on the efﬁcient use of the universities’ resources and university management is
making increasing use of techniques inherited from the private sector. For instance, Ball
and Butler (2004) show that the UK Research Assessment Exercise induced a marked
tendency within universities to adopt business-like methods to improve their qualitysee front matter r 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
.euroecorev.2006.02.006
nding author. Tel.: +322 2117938.
dresses: gautier@fusl.ac.be (A. Gautier), xwauthy@fusl.ac.be (X. Wauthy).
ARTICLE IN PRESS
A. Gautier, X. Wauthy / European Economic Review 51 (2007) 273–295274ratings and reporting strategies. Quite remarkably, a ﬂourishing literature is emerging in
which methodologies inherited from management techniques are developed in order to
ensure an efﬁcient assignment of budgets within and across universities. The splitting of
funds between teaching and research is particularly at stake here (see for instance Abbott
and Doucouliagos, 2003; Caballero et al., 2001, 2004; Fandel and Gal, 2001; Parkan,
2004). These researches focus on the design of performance measures and their use in the
funding allocation process. However, very little attention is paid on the incentive
mechanisms that are induced by such instruments. In the present paper, we precisely
address that point. Moreover, in particular, we show that when properly designed,
incentive schemes based on performance indicators may take advantage of the multi-
department structure of universities in order to enhance both teaching quality and research
quality within each department.
Because universities count teaching and research as part of their core social goals,
evaluating the performance of any university system calls for answering the following
questions. Do universities manage to combine high quality teaching and high quality
research? And, if they do, how? Obviously, one would like to see any university to excel in
both dimensions but beyond wishful thinkings, very little is known about how to
effectively realize this ideal. On the one hand, evidences from UK (see Shattock, 2002)
suggest that universities that perform very well in research also perform well in teaching.
On the other hand, it is hard to see what happens exactly in those universities which are not
in the top 10. The situation is even more opaque in many continental systems where
university assessment is in its very infancy. As argued by Neary et al. (2003), it is widely
accepted that ‘‘. . .poor governance structures and inappropriate incentives. . .still
characterize so many European Universities’’ (p. 1240). While recent empirical studies
tend to become more and more sophisticated when evaluating the quality of research (see
for instance the December 2003 issue of the Journal of the European Economic
Association), very little effort has been devoted to the development of formal models of
university governance, in particular regarding the organization of teaching and research
within universities.
Fortunately enough, combining high quality teaching and high quality research is
actually desirable for the universities themselves. This is in particular true in a system
where universities are mostly ﬁnanced on a per student basis and where students’ choice
depend on (1) teaching quality and (2) university’s prestige (which is related to research
quality). However, combining high quality teaching and high quality research is often
viewed as a challenge or a source of conﬂicts within universities taken as an aggregate.
This is partly due to the individual incentives faced by academics. For them, research and
teaching activities are most often substitutes. Moreover, in many education systems,
academics beneﬁt from a large discretion in the allocation of their working time. Tavernier
and Wilkin (2001) show that academics do use this discretion to a large extent, resulting in
very different occupation proﬁles for academics. Accordingly the actual splitting of their
time among the various tasks they are assigned to is largely a matter of taste and
incentives. There are a priori many ways by which a university could reconcile the
individual conﬂict between teaching and research faced by its academics and the vital
interest of performing well in both dimensions in the aggregate. Promoting specialization,
with some academics being teaching professors and others full time researchers is a
possible solution. Designing incentive schemes that value both aspects simultaneously is
another one. However, there are also constraints limiting what can actually be
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high quality teaching are complements, i.e. in order to be a good teacher, one must also be
a good researcher. Then the ‘‘specialization’’ route must be abandoned. Suppose instead
that research and teaching quality are not equally easy to assess. Then, the actual
implementation of targeted schemes is hampered. In the context of an emergent market for
academics, a similar argument could be made whenever research and teaching abilities are
not equally easy to signal to alternative employers.
As a matter of fact, the tensions between teaching and research have not been widely
studied in the economic literature. A few exceptions are worth being pointed out. Del Rey
(2001) models competition between universities who decide on the allocation of funds
between teaching and research activities. In her model, teaching achievements and research
records enter the university objective function and funding is positively related to the
number of students. She studies the balance between research and teaching efforts as a
function of the funding rules. However, a key feature of her analysis is that academics and
the university authority share the same objective. De Fraja and Iossa (2002) point out that
increased students’ mobility favors the emergence of ‘‘elite’’ institutions, i.e. a limited
number of high research records universities co-existing with other universities focusing on
teaching activities. Beath et al. (2003) focus on the tensions between pure and applied
research under binding budget constraints. However, the teaching side of the academics’
job is not considered in their paper.
In this paper, we start from the agency relationship that links academics to their
authority (rectorate, deans,. . .) and we focus on the links between the multi-tasking nature
of a professor–university relationship and the multi-unit nature of these universities. The
paper is organized around two simple ideas. First, universities are active in multiple ﬁelds:
science, economics, law, . . . . Each ﬁeld is organized within one department, with more or
less autonomy. To a large extent, research and teaching are discipline-speciﬁc and the
decisions made regarding some discipline are largely independent from those taken in other
disciplines.1 In addition, universities are headed by a central authority which in particular
has the ﬁnal decision on the allocation of funds. Most often, the budget is centralized and
the resource constraint applies at the university level. It means that the allocation of
resources is done at the university level too. Thus, universities rely on an internal ﬁnancing
system which is very similar to the internal capital market of a conglomerate ﬁrm (see
Coupe´, 2001). Such practices are widely documented and to a certain extent can be viewed
as socially desirable. University completeness is sometimes believed to be part of a
university’s mission (and this argument might be sufﬁcient to justify a—possibly
inefﬁcient—form of redistribution). However, the ensuing solidarity between ‘‘cash-cow’’
departments and smaller units does not go without tensions.
The second building block of our analysis is the relationship between academics and
authorities. We view it as a multi-task agency problem. The university authority wants to
provide incentives on the two dimensions of teaching and research and we take it as an
assumption that academics must perform teaching and research. While teaching and
research require some effort, we assume that research is more valuable to the academic
than teaching. This might simply reﬂect the tastes of the academic but there are more
fundamental reasons for that. In particular, the emergence of a market for academics
induces more severe career concerns. As a matter of fact, while the quality of individual1This is in particular true if students choose ﬁrst a discipline and second a university where they attend.
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the level of a whole program, rather than at an individual level. Therefore, an academic is
likely to put more effort on research than teaching because research outputs are more
easily appropriable than teaching efforts.2 All in all, inducing effort on the teaching task
might be more difﬁcult to achieve than on the research task.
Consider now the issue of funding. If a university’s funding mostly depends on the
number of students and if these students are (at least partially) responsive to the reputation
of a university program, it is especially crucial to ensure high teaching quality. Because
more funds allow for a better research environment, good teaching performance makes
high research records less costly. Thus, even if academics dislike teaching, they may exert
signiﬁcant efforts on improving teaching quality because, by attracting students, they will
obtain funds that will make high research records less costly. Think of an extreme case
where each academic is totally independent: She teaches the students who choose to attend
her courses and ﬁnances her research with their enrolment fees. Clearly, whatever strong
her distaste for teaching might be, the academic has to teach if she wants her research to be
funded. The funding of research creates a complementarity between the two tasks.
How does the multi-department nature of a university affect the previous argument?
Obviously, the problem comes from the possibility of reallocating funds dedicated to
research between the different departments. The presence of such an internal market for
research funds makes it more costly to induce teaching effort. First, because of an
insurance effect (even if one does not raise any fund it will beneﬁt from research funding).
Second, because the marginal value of effort is smaller (because only part of the funds
raised through teaching effort will be appropriated ex post). In a multi-department
university (MDU), teaching efforts can be viewed as private resources spent at
contributing to the constitution of a common resource. Self-interested academics are
therefore very likely to free-ride on such efforts. On the other hand, because it counts
several departments, the university is able to trigger yardstick competition between
academics for the allocation of research funds. It is for instance the case when the
authority decides to allocate funds to the most valuable research projects. When such a
yardstick competition is at work, high quality research by an academic is likely to induce
high effort by the others. Because it induces both free-riding and yardstick competition, a
multi-unit organization for the university might a priori be thought of as a ‘‘good’’ with
respect to research quality and a ‘‘bad’’ with respect to teaching efforts.
However, we show hereafter that the conﬂict between research and teaching can be
resolved within the multi-unit institution. The multi-department structure preserves
the complementarity between teaching efforts and research efforts which counteracts the
substitution effect possibly present in the academics’ utility function. Building on this,
we show that the conglomerate nature of universities may actually be instrumental in
promoting the quality of the teaching– research bundle as compared to a collection of single
departments. However there is a limit to the virtue of the conglomerate structure: When
departments are too numerous, part of the efﬁciency associated with redistribution must be
sacriﬁced by leaving more budgetary autonomy to the departments.2Moreover, the evaluation of research quality through publication scores or patent holdings is much easy to
establish from outside the university and to transmit than the quality of teaching, which requires internal access to
the institution.
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dealt with in this literature. First, it derives contracting mechanisms that can align the
interests of the principal and the agent, particularly when the tasks are complements for
the principal and substitutes for the agent (Sinclair-Desgagne´, 1999; MacDonald and
Marx, 2001). Sinclair-Desgagne´ (1999) for example proposes an audit mechanism where
the performance on the task which is harder to assess (teaching) is audited whenever the
agent shows a high performance on the other task (research). The payment to the agent is
higher when an audit occurs unless the audit yields a bad assessment of performance on
teaching, where in this case, the agent incurs a monetary penalty. Clearly with such a
mechanism, performing well on research is useless if the academic does not perform well on
teaching too. Hence, the agent views the two tasks as complements and this may
counterbalance the fact that the two tasks are substitutes in his cost function. In this
article, we show that the multi-department structure of a university can achieve the same
goal: It is a tool that can make the efforts complements rather than substitutes in the
academics’ utility function. However, in our framework, we do not use an explicit
contracting process. A second issue of interest in multi-tasking models is the problem of
job design (Holmstro¨m and Milgrom, 1991), that is, given their characteristics, how the
various tasks should be clustered together and delegated to the agent(s). We do not deal
with this problem within universities since we assume that the academics must perform
both teaching and research.
Notice that, by focusing on the tensions between teaching and research, we abstract
from other important problems. For instance, we neglect the implications of the now
standard distinction between pure and applied research (see Jensen and Thursby, 2001) on
performance assessment. We also overlook the third and fourth basic tasks an academic is
asked to perform, namely service to the society and administrative duties. (Tavernier and
Wilkin (2001) show that these activities may indeed crowd out a signiﬁcant share of an
academic’s working time.)
The paper is organized as follows. First, we develop our stylized model. This is done in
Section 2. Sections 3 and 4 characterize optimal contracts and their implications for the
relation between teaching and research. Comparative static results are also dealt with in
these sections. Section 5 discusses the limitations of our analysis as well as possible
extensions. Section 6 concludes.2. The model
We consider a university with NX2 departments. Each department is personiﬁed by a
unique professor, the so-called ‘‘academic’’. There are N þ 1 players: N academics and one
university dean. Thus, we only consider a two layer hierarchy: University dean and
professors.3
Academics allocate their time between two activities: Teaching and Research. The vector
a ¼ ðt; rÞ is the vector of actions where t refers to teaching effort and r refers to research
effort. Performing a level of action a costs the professor CðaÞ. We assume that the cost3Obviously, reality is more complex. Universities display multiple layer hierarchy. However, the present
simpliﬁcation allows us to combine the multi-tasking issues faced by academics with the redistribution problem in
a tractable model.
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q2CðaÞ=ql240.
The sign of q2CðaÞ=qtqr is obviously critical for the analysis to follow. On the one hand,
one could argue that a negative sign for the cross derivative makes sense for relatively low
levels of research output. However, when time constraint becomes really binding, the two
efforts are likely to become substitutes in the academic’s cost function. Casual observation
suggests indeed that those academics who are really active in research are prompt to call
for teaching load reductions from their department.4 Notice that Dundar and Lewis (1995)
actually ﬁnd empirical support for a negative sign. They identify economies of scope
between teaching and research at the department level. However their results hold only
when graduate teaching is considered. Indeed, graduate students might contribute to an
academic’s output as research assistants. A similar result is not likely to hold at
undergraduate teaching level. On the other hand, assuming that the cross derivative is
positive better ﬁts the received literature on multi-tasking. It is indeed under the
assumption that efforts are substitutes that aligning the academics’ incentives in the two
tasks with those of the institution is most problematic. In view of these mixed arguments,
we shall not impose a priori any restriction on the sign of q2CðaÞ=qtqr. However, large
negative synergies between teaching and research would obviously lead to the
specialization of academics in either teaching or research.
Each academic is endowed with a vector of ‘‘talent’’. This vector represents the
professor’s ability to do research and teaching. Talents are denoted by a two-dimensional
vector Zi ¼ ðti; riÞ, where the ﬁrst element represents the professor’s teaching talent and the
second, the professor’s research talent.
A variable yi identiﬁes a proxy for the quality of the research projects undertaken by
professor i. It depends on the effort in research activity and on the professor’s research
talent:
yi ¼ f ðri;riÞ,
with qf =qri40, qf =qri40. Research effort and talent are not perfect substitutes:
q2f =qriqri40. A research project of quality yi leads to a research output only if it is
combined with ﬁnancial resources.
Students’ choice is not explicitly modeled. However, we assume that ni, the number of
students in discipline i, depends on teaching quality in ﬁeld i. Quality itself depends on the
combination of teaching effort and teaching talent of professor i. Hence we assume
ni ¼ gðti; tiÞ,
with qg=qti40, qg=qti40. We assume that talent and effort in teaching activities are not
perfect substitutes: q2g=qtiqti40. Teaching efforts contribute to the constitution of the
general budget of the university through enrolment fees.
Academics receive a ﬁxed wage z from the university. For simplicity, this ﬁxed pay is
normalized to zero. In addition, there is a reward w proportional to the research
output. Denoting research output by the variable Ri, we assume the utility of professor i is
given by
Ui ¼ wRi  CðaÞ.4For instance by buying these reductions with the research grant they receive.
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opportunity, i.e. the professor’s value on the academic market. In the ﬁrst interpretation,
wRi represents the private beneﬁts an academic enjoys from his research achievements.
Private beneﬁts of research could be notoriety, job opportunities, consultancy contracts,
tenure position, . . . . Clearly, in all these examples, the beneﬁt is tied to the academic’s
research output. What is speciﬁc in this model is the linear speciﬁcation of the private
beneﬁt.
Alternatively, wRi can be interpreted as the academic’s market value. Professorships
exhibit nowadays high mobility and high turnovers5 with the consequence that there exists
a true market for academics (see Siow, 1995 on the organization of the market for
professors). The value of an academic on this market is largely inﬂuenced by his research
performance. Hence, a high research output Ri translates into better job opportunities and
a larger pay. Under this interpretation, our model assumes that the market for academics
values research at a per unit price of w. The professor’s value wRi can be interpreted as his
future reservation wage, either inside his institution or elsewhere.6
Notice that the teaching activity does not enter positively in the professor’s utility
function. This rather extreme assumption is meant to capture the idea that teaching is
valuable inside a given university but it has little value outside. For instance, it might be
difﬁcult to signal to the job market high teaching quality. By contrast, research has a high
visibility outside university, and can be used as a signal of quality (talent) on the market.
Therefore, we assume there is a private beneﬁt associated to the research output and no
private beneﬁt associated with teaching. Clearly, this assumption makes the worst case for
teaching efforts.
Regarding Universities, we assume the following. The budget of the university is noted
by B. The university receives a ﬁxed transfer F from the government and a tuition fee s per
student. In state owned systems, the tuition is partially paid by the government. B is then
equal to




In the remaining of the paper, we consider the budget B as the total amount of resources
available for funding research projects. B is thus the university’s resources net of the
academic’s wages (normalized to zero) and all the other spending of a university (which
could account for a large amount). This speciﬁcation of the budget constraint implicitly
assumes the existence of scale economies in the teaching activity. When the number of
students increases, it is likely that the teaching staff increases as well. However, it is
sufﬁcient for our purpose that it increases less than proportionally, so that the residual
budget available for research increases.
The research output of professor i is denoted by Ri. It depends on (i) the project’s quality
yi and (ii) the budget yi allocated to research in department i. The research budget includes
labs, research assistants, sabbatical year, . . . . The production function for research output5See in particular the recent contribution of Ehrenberg (2003).
6Note that this part of the professor’s reward is delayed. It represents the future pay prospect of a professor,
hence, it does not need to be paid immediately out of the university’s budget. Clearly, this interpretation bears
some resemblance with career concern models. This is discussed in Section 5.
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Ri ¼ yivðyiÞ 8i ¼ 1; . . . ;N.
The function vð:Þ is increasing and concave. The concavity of the vð:Þ function implies that
the allocation of the research budget to the departments will not be of the form ‘‘winner
takes all’’. Speciﬁcally, we assume that vðyÞ ¼ y1h with h 2 ð0; 1Þ. Note that to simplify the
analysis, we consider that the production function is not department speciﬁc. However,
this does not mean that all academics are identical with respect to the research activity.
Heterogeneity could indeed be incorporated in the academic’s research talent ri. Talent
could then be interpreted either as a speciﬁc academic talent or as a ﬁeld speciﬁc talent (or
both). The same is true for teaching.
This speciﬁcation for the budget takes as constant other forms of funding which are to a
large extent accessible to a university (typically institutional research fundings by federal or
private agencies). Notice also that we assume that departments do not compete among
themselves for students. In other words, we assume that students’ preferences determine
their ﬁeld of studies while teaching efforts may attract them to the particular university we
study. Thus, teaching effort affects the choice of the university, not the ﬁeld chosen. This is
why teaching efforts increase the university budget.
Within this framework, we may now specify the internal ﬁnancing rules of the university





posAcademics simultaneously choose the actions ai.
2. Students choose their university and the values of ni and yi are observed.
3. Given the qualities of the research projects and the total budget, the university allocates
the research budget to academics.The following assumption underlines the game structure: The university cannot commit
ex ante (that is, before the professors choose the actions) to a particular sharing of the
university budget. Thus, the budget will be allocated ex post (once ni and yi are realized).
Under this allocation rule, whether the university knows academics’ talents or not makes
no difference. We assume that ex post, the university allocates funds to research projects in
order to maximize the aggregate research output
PN
k¼1Rk. Actually, ex ante commitment
to a particular distribution rule would be highly demanding: The university should indeed
be able to specify the allocation of resources given all possible realizations of yk and nk,
k ¼ 1; . . . ;N. Such a rule would be a mapping from the N2-dimensional space of project
quality and students’ number to the N-dimensional space of investments. It is reasonable
to assume that the costs of writing such an allocation rule are prohibitive.7 Moreover, ex
post, the university would still have an incentive to re-negotiate such an arrangement to
allocate its scare funds to the more valuable projects i.e. to maximize the aggregate
research output given the budget.8For references on the cost of writing contracts, see Tirole (1999).
In Section 5 we discuss the case where the university can fully commit ex ante to simple redistribution rules
ere a fraction g of the budget is allocated according to the projects’ relative quality and a fraction 1 g of the
get is allocated according to the number of students. This rule may improve the global performance of the
versity. In this sense our present assumption leads to a model whose outcome deﬁnes a lower bound on the
sible achievements of the university structure.
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university beyond maximization of the aggregate research output given the budget. The
allocation of resources by the university will then be similar to the winner-picking contest
of Stein (1997).9 The analogies between our model of MDUs and models analyzing
conglomerate—for proﬁt—ﬁrms will be discussed later on. The speciﬁcity of our analysis is
to integrate the multi-tasking nature of the incentive problem, which we view as inherent to
the academic job. Be it for teaching or research, the quality of the output essentially results
from the academic’s effort and an academic should perform both tasks.
3. The trade-off between research and teaching efforts
3.1. Optimal efforts
At the last stage of the game, given the budget B and the value of research projects









yk ¼ B. ðP:1Þ
We may then specify the optimal allocation rule for the university budget.
Proposition 3.1. The optimal allocation of the budget is: For all i 2 N
yi ¼ aiB,





Proof. The ﬁrst-order conditions for problem ðP:1Þ are
yið1 hÞyhi ¼ l.





























k B. &9‘Simply put, individual projects must compete for the scarce funds, and the headquarters’ job is to pick the
winners and the losers in this competition.’ (Stein, 1997, p. 111).
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of the budget. From Proposition 3.1 the following comparative static results are
immediate:







In other words, the resource allocation process is based on the relative quality of
research projects, an effect which is typical of a winner-picking contest.10 This means
that in a MDU, the quality of project i alone cannot explain the budget allocated to
professor i. In a MDU, budget allocation depends on the quality of all projects.
As we will see, this allocation scheme, which is speciﬁc to a MDU, creates yard-
stick competition between academics and as such, is an important part of the incentive
package.
University behavior in the last stage is perfectly anticipated by academics. Using
Proposition 3.1, we may now analyze the ﬁrst stage of the game. Integrating the optimal
budget allocation scheme, the professor i’s utility function is





thaCli is the partial derivative of CðaiÞ with respect to li, l ¼ t; r,









The RHS of (3.3) and (3.4) are, respectively, the marginal beneﬁt of teaching effort and
research effort. We assume that there exists a unique interior solution to this system.11 We
denote this solution ti and r

i . Obviously, an increase in the marginal beneﬁt of task l leads
to an increase of li , l ¼ t; r. We now state:
Lemma 3.1. The marginal benefit of teaching (resp. research) effort increases with the level
of research effort (resp. teaching effort).0‘Speciﬁcally, the extent to which any given project gets funded in an internal capital market will depend not
y on that project’s own absolutemerits, but also on its merits relative to other projects in the company’s overall
tfolio’ (Stein, 1997, p. 112).
1Since vð:Þ is strictly concave and Cð:Þ is convex, a sufﬁcient condition for the program to be globally concave is
t the cross derivative of the cost function is not too large.
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is given by
v0ðaiBÞai þ yiv0ðaiBÞa0i þ yiv00ðaiBÞaia0iB. (3.5)
Only the last term in this expression is negative (since vð:Þ is concave and a0i40). A sufﬁcient
condition for a positive sign of (3.5) is v0ðaiBÞ4 v00ðaiBÞaiB, which is always true given the
assumption on vð:Þ. Note that we could reach the same result by taking the derivative of
(3.3) with respect to ti; the sign of this expression is obviously given by (3.5). &
The MDU creates a complementarity between teaching and research efforts. The previous
lemma implies the following: (1) If teaching and research are complements in the
academics’ cost function (q2CðaÞ=qtqro0), the multi-unit structure of the university
reinforces this complementarity. (2) If teaching and research are substitutes in the
academics’ cost function (q2CðaÞ=qtqr40), the two tasks are complements in a MDU if




Eq. (3.5) measures the complementarity created by the MDU structure. If it is strong
enough, it can countervail the potential negative synergies coming from the cost side. We
now show that this complementarity decreases with the university overall budget B, that is,
a larger university creates less complementarity than a smaller one.
Lemma 3.2. The complementarity between teaching effort and research effort created by the
MDU structure decreases with the university’s budget B.
Proof. The derivative of (3.5) with respect to B is
v00ðaiBÞða2i þ 2aia0iyiÞ þ a2i a0iyiBv000ðaiBÞ. (3.7)
Given the speciﬁc functional form we impose on vð:Þ, we have aiBv000ðaiBÞ ¼ ð1 hÞ
v00ðaiBÞ. Hence, (3.7) is clearly negative. &
We are now in a position to address our key issue, i.e. to assess the efﬁciency of a
conglomerate form for the university. Since under our assumptions there exist no synergies
between departments outside those resulting from the budget sharing, any difference
between a single department university (SDU) and a MDU is explained by the
organizational form of the university.
3.2. SDU and MDU
Consider a SDU, i.e. a university made of a unique academic endowed with a vector of
talent ðt;rÞ. In a SDU, there is no budget allocation scheme, since there is only one research
project of quality y ¼ f ðr; rÞ available; therefore, y ¼ B. The professor’s utility is then
U ¼ w½yvðBÞ  CðaÞ.
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(3.8)). Everything else being equal (the research budget B in a SDU equals aiB in a MDU;
and the value of the research project), the marginal beneﬁt of teaching in a MDU is aio1
times the marginal beneﬁt in a single department. Hence, a MDU provides the academics
with less incentives to do teaching.
The reason is that the budget is a pure private good in a SDU while it tends to be a
common resource in a MDU. If in a SDU any additional resource created by attracting
more students is invested in the department’s research project, in a MDU, any additional
resource goes to the common pool of resources from which department i gets only a
fraction aio1. Hence an academic can only appropriate a fraction ai of the additional
budget.
An insurance effect is also at play in our framework. Indeed, the availability of funds
within the university affects the marginal beneﬁt of teaching through the term v0ðaiBÞ. By
concavity of vð:Þ, the larger the budget, the lower the marginal beneﬁt of teaching. An
academic would have lower incentives to teach should its university be endowed with a
large budget B and, conversely, a low budget stimulates teaching effort. Lemma 3.3 will
illustrate this effect more clearly.




Proof. An increase in tj leads to an increase of the university budget B. To measure the







Clearly, the marginal beneﬁt of teaching for professor i decreases when the budget
increases i.e. when tj increases. &
Thus teaching efforts are unambiguously strategic substitutes. This illustrates the
insurance effect we mentioned. When there are more resources, the individual incentives to
create additional resources diminish.
Turning to the comparison of marginal beneﬁts of research in a MDU and a SDU
(Eqs. (3.4) and (3.9)), we note the additional term yiv0ðaiBÞa0iBðqyi=qriÞ in (3.4). This
term is positive. Hence, everything else being equal (the research budget B in a SDU
equals aiB in a MDU), the marginal beneﬁt of a research effort is larger in a MDU than
in a SDU.
The additional term in (3.4) measures the competitive effect of having a MDU.
In a MDU, professors compete for the research budget. Given that the budget allo-
cation scheme is based on the relative quality of projects, the professors have to produce
higher quality research to grab the resources from the university. Increasing research
effort increases the share of the budget captured by the academic. The competition
for research funding, as induced by the MDU structure, leads to an increase of
research quality.
Summing up, integrating departments in a MDU changes academics’ incentives:
It creates free-riding on teaching and yardstick competition on research, i.e. a MDU
provides more incentives to do research and less incentives for teaching than a SDU.
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The answer is no because in those circumstances where tasks are complements (i.e.
Eq. (3.6) holds) higher effort in one task induces higher effort in the other task. Hence,
it is possible that a MDU offers a better quality teaching and performs better research
than a SDU. The reverse could also be true. Last, it is also possible that MDU performs
better on one dimension only. However, the next proposition shows that a MDU cannot
perform better than a SDU on the teaching side only when tasks are complements.
To establish this result, we compare a MDU with a collection of SDU replicating the
MDU’s departments.
Proposition 3.2. If condition (3.6) holds and for all i ¼ 1; . . . ;N, tMDUi 4tSDU then
rMDUi 4r
SDU.
Proof. Suppose tMDUi 4t
SDU and rMDUi orSDU. Because rMDUi orSDU, the marginal beneﬁt
of teaching efforts is smaller in the MDU than in the SDU. In order for this to be
compatible with higher teaching efforts in the MDU, we need that the marginal cost of
teaching effort is smaller in the MDU than in the SDU when research effort is smaller.
This cannot be the case if q2CðaÞ=qtqrp0. If q2CðaÞ=qtqr40, the decrease in the marginal
cost of teaching must be large enough to compensate for the decrease in marginal beneﬁt.
However, this requires that teaching and research efforts are substitutes, i.e. condition (3.6)
is not satisﬁed. &
Proposition 3.2 shows that a sufﬁcient condition for having more research effort in all
departments is to have more teaching in all departments. However, depending on the
distribution of talents, it is possible that in some department, a MDU has a better
performance, while in other department a MDU does worse. We propose hereafter an
example which allows to discuss the basic intuitions underlying the general trade-off
between teaching and research incentives.3.3. An example
Each academic is characterized by a vector Zi ¼ ðti;riÞ of talent. The research output in
department i is Riðyi; yiÞ ¼ yiy1hi , with ho1 where yi ¼ riri. We assume that all the
academics are identical with respect to talent. This means that Zi ¼ ðt;rÞ; 8i.
The university is ﬁnanced exclusively by a per student fee s. The number of students in
department i is niðti; tiÞ ¼ tit. Hence the total budget is B ¼ st
PN
k¼1tk.
The costs of teaching and research efforts are separable. Speciﬁcally, we assume
CðaiÞ ¼ t2i =2þ r2i =2.





The ﬁrst-order conditions are
w½yð1 hÞðsttÞhðstÞ ¼ t, (3.11)
w½ðsttÞ1hr ¼ r. (3.12)
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tSDU ¼ ð1 hÞ1=2hw1=hr1=hðstÞð1hÞ=h, (3.13)
rSDU ¼ ð1 hÞð1hÞ=2hw1=hr1=hðstÞð1hÞ=h. (3.14)
























The ﬁrst-order conditions are


























5r ¼ ri. (3.17)
Using the fact that all academics are identical, we can replace
PN
k¼1tk by Nti, ai by 1=N
and a0i by ð1=hyiÞaið1 aiÞ ¼ ð1=hyiÞððN  1Þ=N2Þ.
Simplifying and solving the system for the efforts ti and ri, we obtain an explicit relation
between optimal values in the single division university and a multi-division one:
tMDUi ¼ ð1 hÞ1=2hw1=hr1=hðstÞð1hÞ=h
1
N1=h




rMDUi ¼ ð1 hÞð1hÞ=2hw1=hr1=hðstÞð1hÞ=h
1
N1=h










with g1ðNÞ ¼ ð1=N1=hÞððN þ h 1Þ=hÞ1=2h and g2ðNÞ ¼ ð1=N1=hÞððN þ h 1Þ=hÞð1þhÞ=2h.




A. Gautier, X. Wauthy / European Economic Review 51 (2007) 273–295 287Proposition 3.3 summarizes our ﬁndings:
Proposition 3.3. For all ho1, there exist real numbers N1oNroN2, with Nr41 and N1X1
if hp1
2
such that 8N 2 ½1;Max½1;N1, we have tMDUi XtSDU, rMDUi XrSDU, and RMDUi XRSDU:
 8N 2 ½Max½1;N1;Nr, we have tMDUi ptSDU, rMDUi XrSDU, and RMDUi XRSDU:
 8N 2 ½Nr;N2, we have tMDUi ptSDU, rMDUi XrSDU, and RMDUi pRSDU:
 8NXN2, we have tMDUi ptSDU, rMDUi prSDU, and RMDUi pRSDU:Proof. The equation g1ðNÞ ¼ 1 is equivalent to hN2 þN þ h 1 ¼ 0. The roots of this
second-degree equation are: N ¼ 1 and N ¼ N1 ¼ ð1 hÞ=h. g1ðNÞ is larger than 1 when N
lies between the two roots. When h41
2
, N1o1 and 8N41, we have, g1ðNÞo1 and
tMDUi otSDU. When hp12, N1X1 and 8N 2 ½1;N1 , we have g1ðNÞX1 and tMDUi XtSDU. For
all N4N1X1, we have g1ðNÞo1 and tMDUi otSDU.
The equation g2ðNÞ ¼ 1 is equivalent to hN2=ð1þhÞ þN þ h 1 ¼ 0. We ﬁrst show that
if ho1, this equation has two roots in the interval ½1;þ1½: N ¼ 1 and N241. First, N ¼ 1
is clearly a root of this equation. Second, hN2=ð1þhÞ þN þ h is increasing up to N ¼
ðð1þ hÞ=2hÞð1hÞ=ð1þhÞ41 and decreasing afterwards. Hence, there is another root N241.
g2ðNÞ is larger than 1 when N lies in between the two roots 1 and N2. Hence for all
N 2 ½1;N2, g2ðNÞX1 and rMDUi XrSDU, and for all N4N2, g2ðNÞo1 and rMDUi orSDU.
The root N2 is larger than N1. Indeed, g2ðNÞ ¼ g1ðNÞððN þ h 1Þ=hÞ1=2. Clearly
g2ðNÞ4g1ðNÞ for all N41. Hence, when g1ðN1Þ ¼ 1, g2ðN1Þ is still larger than 1.
The equation g1ðNÞ1hg2ðNÞ ¼ 1 is equivalent to hN2h þN þ h 1 ¼ 0. For ho1,
this equation has two roots in the interval ½1;þ1½: N ¼ 1 and Nr41. The analysis is
similar to the equation g2ðNÞ ¼ 1: hN2h þN þ h 1 ¼ 0 increases up to N ¼ ð1=ðhð2
hÞÞÞ1=ð1hÞ41 and decreases after. Hence for all N 2 ½1;Nr, RMDUi XRSDU, and for all
N4Nr, RMDUi oRSDU.
Last, the root Nr lies in between N1 and N2. Indeed, when N ¼ N1, g1ðN1Þ1hg2ðN1Þ is
larger than 1 since the ﬁrst term equals 1 and the second is 41. When N ¼ N2,
g1ðN2Þ1hg2ðN2Þ is lower than 1 since the second term equals 1 and the ﬁrst is o1. &





N1 then deﬁnes the critical ‘‘size’’ beyond which the free-riding effect of the MDU more
than compensates the initial positive effect. N2 deﬁnes the critical level beyond which the
MDU structure leads to less research efforts. When there are too many departments,




Fig. 2. h ¼ 1
2
.
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number of department increases, the free-riding effect comes into play as well as the
competition effect. However, when the number is small enough the introduction of
competition for research funding increases efforts in the research dimension which
increases effort in the teaching dimension as well, because of the complementarity effect. In
other words, because teaching and research activities remain complements, a bit of
competition for research fundings overcomes the free-riding effect. We identify by Nr the
critical number of departments for which the research outputs are identical in the SDU and
in the MDU. Notice then that this research output is achieved with a lower budget in the
MDU, which is then compensated by a larger research effort.
The numerical approximations for our critical values for N are fN1;Nr;N2g ¼
f3; 5:15; 8:66g for h ¼ 1
4
and fN1;Nr;N2g ¼ f1; 2:62; 6:22g for h ¼ 12. Although we have
not been able to prove it formally, our computations indicate that all of these threshold
values are decreasing in h. Recall that in this example a larger h means that vð:Þ is more
concave, so that the marginal contribution of funds to research output is decreasing
quickly. By contrast, when h ¼ 1 the marginal contribution is constant. In other words, a
lower h means that redistribution possibilities become more valuable. It is therefore not
surprising that a MDU remains more efﬁcient than a collection of SDU for a larger
number of departments.
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of Proposition 3.3:
Corollary 3.2. There exists a unique N41 such that the aggregate research output is
maximal.
Proof. N is the maximum of g1ðNÞ1hg2ðNÞ. The derivative of g1ðNÞ1hg2ðNÞ with respect
to N is (after simpliﬁcation)






NðN þ h 1Þ  ð2 hÞ
 
.
N is the solution of 1=ðNðN þ h 1ÞÞ ¼ ð2 hÞ. Solving the equation, if ho1, there is a




ð1 hÞ2 þ 4=ð2 hÞ
q
. Clearly, N41. &
This last result shows that in order to maximize the research output, the university
should have some level of diversiﬁcation. Notice however that N is actually less than 2,
whatever the value of h. Accordingly, when we take the restriction NX2 into account, the
desirability of a multi-unit university cannot be evaluated through N. The relevant
comparison is between Nr and 2. Condition Nr42 is not satisﬁed for all h 2 ½0; 1 but our
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always exists a feasible MDU structure which exhibits a better research output than the
corresponding collection of single-unit divisions. The fact that h cannot be too large is
intuitive: Suppose h is arbitrarily close to 1, then research output (almost) does not depend
on research funding. In this case, very few is to be gained through redistribution
opportunities, while free-riding already undermines teaching efforts. On the other hand, if
h is smaller, the competition for funds is ﬁercer. Accordingly, its positive effect overcomes
the negative free-riding effect for a larger number of divisions.
4. Mixed research funding
So far, we assumed that the allocation of the university’s budget to research projects is a
pure winner-picking contest, i.e. the ﬁnancing of an academic’s research only depends on
the relative quality of its project. This allocation rule has a positive effect on research
incentives due to yardstick competition but a negative effect on teaching incentives due to
free-riding. In fact, the absence of reward for the teaching effort is the most important
problem associated with winner-picking, especially when the number of academics is large.
Obviously, the university could alleviate this problem by departing from winner-picking
and allocating its resources not only according to the relative quality of research projects
but also depending on the teaching’s quality, measured for example by the number of
students in ﬁeld i.12 In fact, in most universities, the number of students per department
matters for deciding on the allocation of research funds.
Limiting the scope of winner-picking and integrating the number of students as a
determinant of the budget sharing rule, together with the project’s relative quality, would
have a positive effect on teaching incentives since it would make the teaching effort more
appropriable by the academic. However, this kind of sharing rule proves hard to use
because the university should ex ante, that is, before the academics choose the efforts,
design (and commit to) a sophisticated sharing rule. As discussed in Section 2, full
commitment would imply that the university decides ex ante the way the budget will be
allocated given all possible realizations of nk and yk, k ¼ 1; . . . ;N. Commitment to such a
rule would require that both the number of students and the projects’ quality are
veriﬁable.13 If it does not seem to be a problem for the students’ number, it is much more
demanding in terms of information for the projects’ quality.14 Outsiders, such as a court
would need a lot of information and a great expertise to verify the qualities of the research
projects.
With nonveriﬁable y, the university can implement ex ante two kind of sharing rules:
Winner-picking and rules based on the number of students only. Despite the
nonveriﬁability of y, winner-picking is implementable since it corresponds to the optimal
allocation of resources ex post (once they are created). Hence, to implement winner-
picking, the university simply decides to postpone the deﬁnition of the sharing rule until
the budget is realized. Rules based on the number of students create strong incentives for12Notice that such a rule is likely to conﬂict with equity considerations since it introduces a bias in favor of
those disciplines which are lucky enough to attract large cohorts of students simply because of labor market
conditions.
13Recall indeed that only veriﬁable information could be included in a contract.
14Remember that the project quality yi is only a part of the ﬁnal research record Ri , the latest being perfectly
veriﬁable.
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competition effect. It is particularly clear in the rule that replicates the stand alone
university: yi ¼ sni, where there is no free-riding but no yardstick competition. Rules based
on the number of students (or more generally on teaching quality) thus reduce the beneﬁts
of the conglomerate structure of a university.
To see how things are going with full commitment and a veriﬁable project’s quality, let
us consider a particular rule that mixes winner-picking with an allocation based on the
number of students. Suppose that the university commits to split the budget B into two
parts: A fraction g of the budget B will be allocated according to the relative quality of the
projects (winner-picking), while a fraction 1 g will be allocated according to the relative
number of students enroled in the departments. With this rule, the research budget of
academic i is
yi ¼ gaiBþ ð1 gÞbiB, (4.20)
where ai is given by Proposition 3.1 and bi ¼ ni=
PN
k¼1nk.
If the university applies the sharing rule given by (4.20), funds could be inefﬁciently
allocated ex post: Once the nk and yk are realized, there is room for a redistribution that
increases the aggregate research output. Strong commitment by the university is then
necessary to apply this rule.
When the research budget is given by (4.20), the ﬁrst-order conditions read as follows:
Cti ¼ w½yiv0ðyiÞ ðgai þ ð1 gÞbiÞ
qB
qti








Consider ﬁrst the incentives to perform research effort. Yardstick competition is still present
but the incentive effect is reduced because the academics compete only for a fraction g of the
budget. Moreover, for those academics who beneﬁt from a large research ﬁnancing because
a lot of students attend their ﬁeld, the beneﬁt of competing for the university budget is
lower. Consider next the teaching effort. There is still free-riding because only a fraction of
the incremental budget created by academic i will be invested in his research project.
However, there are more incentives to teach because the share of the budget for project i is
increasing with teaching effort by academic i. Hence, the new sharing rule increases the
incentives for teaching and decreases the incentives for research. But because of the
complementarity between the two tasks, the global effect is ambiguous. We may rely on the
example developed in the above section to shed some light on the various effects at work.
As for the case of mixed-funding, our example reveals the following. Suppose go1.
Given that all academics are identical, in the ﬁrst-order conditions (4.21) and (4.22), ai and
bi can both be replaced by 1=N. Solving for the effort levels we have
tMDUi ¼ tSDUg3ðN ; gÞ, (4.23)
rMDUi ¼ rSDUg4ðN; gÞ, (4.24)
with g4ðN; gÞ ¼ ð1=ðN1=hÞÞððhN þ ð1 hÞðn 1ÞgÞ=hÞð1þhÞ=2hð1þ ð1 gÞðN  1ÞÞð1hÞ=2h and
g3ðN; gÞ ¼ ½g4ðN; gÞð1þ ð1 gÞðN  1ÞÞ1=ð1þhÞ. Notice that g3ðN; 1Þ ¼ g1ðNÞ and
g4ðN; 1Þ ¼ g2ðNÞ.
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XN
k¼1
Rk ¼ NrirðstitÞ1h ¼ NrrSDUðstÞ1hðtSDUÞ1hg3ðN; gÞ1hg4ðN; gÞ.
If the university sets g in order to maximize the aggregate research output, we have:
Proposition 4.1. If NX2, it is efficient to set g ¼ g ¼ ðð1 hÞNÞ=ððN  1Þð2 hÞÞ with
0ogo1.
Proof. g  maxg g3ðN; gÞ1hg4ðN; gÞ. &
With identical academics, there is no distortion in the allocation of resources to the
academics since ai ¼ bi. Hence, there is no loss due to a misallocation of resources ex post.
This would no longer be true if the academics were different. Selecting g just reﬂects the
balance between incentives to teach and to do research. The fact that the university
optimally sets go1 means that it achieves a larger aggregate research output with the
redistribution rule (4.20). Hence, the beneﬁts of conglomerate organization for a university
increases when it can make research budgets contingent on both the research’s and the
teaching’s quality.
As an immediate corollary of the above proposition we note also that qg=qNo0.
Accordingly, the more departments there are, the more budgetary autonomy these
departments should be left with.
5. Comments
5.1. Robustness
Sections 3 and 4 have been devoted to disentangling the nature of the trade-off between
teaching and research efforts in a MDU. Roughly speaking, our analysis suggests that a
MDU may actually achieve some form of redistribution in research funding among
departments without giving away efﬁciency, i.e. inducing more efforts on teaching quality
and research quality. This is especially true in cases where research outputs are heavily
dependent on funding levels (h small). Since our model is quite speciﬁc, we now question its
robustness to alternative assumptions.
Pay related to performance scheme: In the analysis, we assumed that there is no direct
pay related to performance for the academics and, in particular, there is no reward to
teaching. Indeed, for academics, a higher teaching quality is valuable only because it
increases the total research budget. This assumption can be justiﬁed by the fact that
teaching quality, unlike research quality, is difﬁcult to assess. Moreover, if research quality
is comparable across academics in the same ﬁeld, measures of teaching quality are often
institution speciﬁc, hence less comparable. Suppose however that the university designs a
measure of teaching quality. Typically this measure could result from students’
evaluations. Denote by qi a proxy for the teaching quality by professor i. The relevant
measure of teaching quality should be correlated with teaching effort and teaching talent:
qiðti; tiÞ with qqi=qti40 and qqi=qti40.
With observable teaching quality qi, the market value of a professor i is now: w½Ri þ dqi
where d is the weight given to teaching. Integrating this pay structure in the academic’s
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and (3.4) which remains unchanged.
Obviously, the effect on optimal teaching effort is positive. Moreover, the more precise
is the quality measure, the more positive the impact. Given Lemma 3.1 we may conclude
that research efforts will increase as well.
Alternative financing sources: A key feature of our model is that departments rely
exclusively on the university central budget to ﬁnance research. Real life departments have
also access to alternative source of funding. We will not address here the possible funding
related to consultancy, and more generally private funding related to applied research.
Obviously, the incentives to rely on such sources are larger when basic research efforts are
less appropriable. Aside from consultancy, academics may rely on institutional funds to
ﬁnance their basic research. Academics also face yardstick competition for these funds.
Moreover, their competitors are in general working in a similar discipline, so that
competition is likely to be tougher. It therefore seems reasonable to consider that research
effort is likely to be larger there. However, the key implication of these fundings is that
they are unrelated to the result of teaching efforts.15 Accordingly, wider access to these
funds breaks the complementarity between teaching and research efforts. Notice here that
the argument equally applies to SDUs and MDUs. However, because the MDU already
faces a free-riding problem in the teaching activity, the negative impact of these external
fundings on teaching efforts could actually be stronger.5.2. Career concerns
There is no direct incentive or performance related to pay in our model. Rather, the
model relies on implicit incentives where current actions inﬂuence future opportunities. To
put it differently, implicit incentives mean that the university cannot control the per unit
reward w.
This incentive structure shares features with the career concern model of Holmstro¨m
(1982) and Dewatripont et al. (1999a,b). We should stress however that our framework
differs from career concern ones in one fundamental respect. In the career concern model,
the agent’s pay reﬂects the market’s expectation of the unknown agent’s talent given the
observables. Applied to our framework, this means that wRi is the expected wage of a
professor on the academic market, given observables i.e. given research records. In this
case, the market would pay academics according to their perceived talent. Clearly, the
market will use the research output to assess the talent of an academic, and the academic’s
pay will increase with the research output. But market assessment of research talent would
also take into account the amount available for the research of professor i. And to make
correct assessment about the research budget yi, the market needs to infer the value of the
total budget B and the redistribution rule that applies within the university. If it is common
knowledge that the university allocates its budget in order to maximize the aggregate15The research assessment exercise currently undertaken in the UK provides a very clear example of such
practices. Approximately 1 million £ per year of public funds are distributed according to the quality ratings
obtained through this exercise, without any references to teaching quality or enrolment.
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budget yi will depend on the expectation of the unknown talents rj of all professors
j ¼ 1; . . . ;N within the same university since redistribution will be based not only on the
project’s quality yi but also on the qualities of the other projects yj as all professors
compete for the same budget. Moreover, the market should evaluate the total budget size,
which depends not only on the expectation of the unknown talents tj, j ¼ 1; . . . ;N. Hence,
the market value of professor i depends not only on his observed research output but also
on the observed research output of his colleague in other ﬁelds. This would make the
model extremely difﬁcult to solve. We then take another route and assume the beneﬁt of
research is simply proportional to the professor’s research output. Accordingly, our model
cannot be viewed as a career concern model. The market values identically a research
record resulting from a high effort and/or high talent than a research record resulting from
a poor talent but a large research budget. Hence, we consider a myopic market, where the
professor’s value depends only on his observable: His research achievement Ri.
6. Conclusion
Universities are most often organized as multi-unit departments headed by a single
central authority. They also obtain a very signiﬁcant share of their funds from enrolment
fees and/or per student subsidies. Universities are asked to perform well in teaching and
research activities. In this respect, a multi-unit organization allows for a redistribution of
research funds which may be relatively independent of the origin of funds. However, it is
often argued that such a redistribution weakens academics’ incentives to perform well in
their teaching duties. This is especially intuitive if the bulk of an academic pay and prestige
depends on research records rather than teaching performance.
In this paper, we show that the multi-unit organization of universities is not
incompatible with improved performance in both teaching and research. In other words,
the lack of direct incentives towards teaching activities can be overcome. Central to this
result is the organization of yardstick competition between departments which combined
with the strategic complementarity between teaching and research may promote
academics’ efforts in both dimensions. However, the number of departments cannot be
too large.
Our analysis is related to the literature on incentives in conglomerate ﬁrms. This
literature considers that divisions are in charge of only one task. Brusco and Panunzi
(2005) and Gautier and Heider (2002) consider the case where divisional managers exert
efforts to raise funds for investment while the quality of the investment projects is given.
They show that the redistribution of funds reduces incentives to exert effort in the fund
raising activity. In Inderst and Laux (2005), resources are given and managers exert effort
to develop valuable projects. The allocation of resources to the most valuable projects by
the corporate headquarter increases incentives. In the present paper, we combine the two
dimensions in a multi-tasking framework where the resources and the projects’ value are
endogenous and result from the performance of a manager (professor). In this respect, our
analysis suggests that the beneﬁts of a conglomerate structure essentially depend on the
number of divisions, i.e. the value of diversiﬁcation has to be linked with the level (or
degree) of diversiﬁcation. However, it does not address the question of which type of
departments to merge in a university. Moreover, in particular, if the university dean has
the choice between different academic proﬁles, what is an efﬁcient combination of such
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value of a conglomerate ﬁrm? Notice also that an interesting extension of the present
model would consider the presence of effective competition for students either within some
given universities or among different universities. These questions are left for future
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